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We examined majority group members’ collective action on behalf of a minority group, 
focusing on the role of outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt. As expected, 
outgroup perspective taking was positively associated with heterosexuals’ collective action 
in response to hate crimes against non-heterosexuals and Whites’ action in response to hate 
crimes against Blacks (Studies 1 and 2). This association was partially mediated by group-based 
guilt (Studies 2 and 3). We also examined the role of group-based anger; although it directly 
related to collective action, it did not mediate the association between perspective taking and 
collective action. Finally, we manipulated outgroup perspective taking to demonstrate its causal 
role in the subsequent outcomes (Study 3).
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Collective action can be a powerful force for 
social change. Women’s right to vote, African 
American’s civil liberties, and lesbian, gay and 
bisexual’s growing equality are all the result 
of social movements. Nearly all research on 
participation in collective action has focused 
on predicting when individuals join groups 
that directly benefi t themselves. For example, 
research has examined women’s participation in 
feminist groups (Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004), 
elderly individuals’ participation in advocacy 
groups for the aged such as the Gray Panthers 
(Klandermans, 2002), and African Americans’ 
participation in civil rights groups (McAdam, 
1982). Yet people can participate in collective 
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action on behalf of groups they do not belong 
to. For example, Whites participated in the civil 
rights movement for Blacks, men participated 
in organizations to fi ght sexism against women, 
and heterosexuals participate in action through 
Gay–Straight Alliances and Gay, Lesbian, and 
Straight Education networks (Arsenault, 2006; 
Miceli, 2005). Because taking action on behalf 
of an outgroup is likely driven by reasons other 
than self-interest or own-group interest, existing 
research examining collective action that directly 
benefi ts the ingroup might not generalize to 
this phenomenon. The present research tests a 
model that explains majority group members’ 
participation in collective action that benefi ts 
minority group members. Specifi cally, in the 
context of actual hate crimes, we examine how 
outgroup perspective taking and group-based 
guilt relate to heterosexuals’ (Study 1) and 
Whites’ (Study 2–3) participation in collective 
action on behalf of non-heterosexuals and 
Blacks, respectively. We also explore the role of 
ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger 
in this process.
The majority of research on collective action has 
focused on factors that motivate disadvantaged 
group members to work toward change. For 
example, Taylor and McKirnan’s (1984) fi ve-
stage model of intergroup relations describes 
changes in the relationship between advantaged 
and disadvantaged group members that spark the 
desire for social change. A shift occurs between 
stages 1 and 2 such that disadvantaged group 
members no longer perceive group differences 
as legitimate. The transition from stages 2 to 3 
involves an increased focus on individual achieve-
ment and social mobility. If disadvantaged group 
members with high status try to gain acceptance 
into the advantaged group but are rejected, they 
may progress to stage 4 and attempt to raise the 
status of the entire disadvantaged group. Stage 5 
results in a competitive style of intergroup rela-
tions. This model assumes that majority group 
members perceive the status difference as legiti-
mate; however, a subset of majority group mem-
bers may progress through this model in a manner 
similar to members of a disadvantaged group.
Collaboration between majority and minority 
group members can result in collective action 
that may produce signifi cant social change for at 
least two reasons. First, the majority group mem-
ber presence can be helpful because members of 
the majority often have more power than mem-
bers of a disadvantaged minority (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996). Second, 
collective action by majority group members 
may be more persuasive than collective action 
by minority group members. Research on inter-
personal confrontation of discrimination shows 
that majority group members are more persuasive 
to the ingroup than are minority group members 
because majority group members are not per-
ceived as direct benefi ciaries of their action 
(Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Jones, 1976). Thus, 
majority group members can send a powerful 
and persuasive message to other majority group 
members when they take action on behalf of a 
minority outgroup.
Yet it is easy for majority group members to not 
take action to ensure the rights of other groups. 
After all, collective action requires time and 
energy, and can be perceived as offering little 
in the way of personal gain—especially when the 
benefi ts are for members of a different group. 
Additionally, majority group members usually 
do not personally experience the same types of 
negative events that trigger collective action in 
disadvantaged minority group members. Among 
the disadvantaged, triggers of collective action 
might range from critical incidents such as the 
assassination of a political leader or failure to 
pass equal rights legislation, to myriad smaller 
disadvantages that accumulate until they reach 
a tipping point (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984; 
Wright & Tropp, 2002). Once triggered, dis-
parate treatment is no longer tolerable, and dis-
advantaged group members work to fi ght for 
change on behalf of the ingroup as a whole. 
Because majority group members are usually 
not personally affected by such trigger events, 
a different process is needed to explain their 
participation in collective action on behalf of 
the disadvantaged outgroup.
Given the importance of majority group mem-
bers’ participation in collective action on behalf 
of minority group members and the dearth 
of research examining this phenomenon, we 
sought to propose an account of why this may 
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occur. Drawing upon research on perspective 
taking, emotion, and helping behavior at the 
individual level, we expect outgroup perspective 
taking and group-based guilt to work in con-
cert to explain outgroup helping behavior 
(i.e. collective action). Specifi cally, we expect that 
taking the perspective of an outgroup will lead 
majority group members to experience group-
based guilt and participate in collective action 
on behalf of that outgroup. Later we describe 
the empirical basis for each proposed link.
Perspective taking and collective 
action
There are at least two reasons to expect per-
spective taking will lead to action on behalf of an 
outgroup. First, existing research suggests that 
taking the perspective of an outgroup member 
increases positive evaluations of that individual 
and the group more generally (Batson et al., 
1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). It is 
reasonable to expect that people are more likely 
to engage in collective action on behalf of liked, 
as opposed to disliked, groups. Second, and per-
haps more importantly, perspective taking at the 
individual level is a key antecedent of helping 
others (Batson, 1998; Underwood & Moore, 
1982). For example, participants who took the 
perspective of a recently orphaned fellow student 
volunteered more time to help the student than 
participants who did not take her perspective 
(Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). Although not 
yet empirically tested, a similar association may 
also exist at the group level, whereby taking the 
outgroup perspective increases the likelihood 
of helping the outgroup by participating in 
collective action that benefi ts them.
Group-based guilt and collective action
Group-based emotions, especially guilt, may 
also directly lead to collective action and be 
a means by which outgroup perspective tak-
ing indirectly leads to action. According to 
perspectives including intergroup emotions 
theory (E. R. Smith, 1993), emotions may be 
experienced at both the individual and group 
level (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). 
At the individual level, guilt results when an 
individual accepts personal responsibility for an 
action or inaction that results in the suffering 
of another (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 
1998). At the group level, one need not accept 
personal responsibility but the ingroup must 
be seen as responsible for mistreating another 
group, the mistreatment must have produced 
an existing disparity, and efforts to repair the 
damage must be seen as possible in order for 
group-based guilt to arise (Branscombe et al., 
2002; Mallett & Swim, 2004). Research at both 
the individual and group levels reveals that 
specifi c emotions correspond to unique behav-
ioral responses; feelings of guilt tend to motivate 
reparation (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998; Frijda, 1988; Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000). For example, White Americans’ 
feeling of group-based guilt for harming 
African Americans is associated with support 
for affi rmative action policies (Iyer, Leach, & 
Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999) and for 
opposition to future aggression against the 
outgroup (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). 
In addition to supporting reparative policies 
and suppressing future aggression, we expect 
that group-based guilt might also prompt ma-
jority group members to spend time and energy 
taking action on behalf of the outgroup.
Outgroup perspective taking should also 
indirectly lead to participation in collective 
action via feelings of group-based guilt. At the 
individual level, perspective taking is associated 
with feelings of guilt (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). 
At the group level, majority group members who 
take an outgroup’s perspective may begin to 
understand the outgroup’s suffering, and perhaps 
consider the role that the majority group plays in 
harming the minority group (Zebel, Doosje, & 
Spears, 2008. Perceiving ingroup responsibility 
and outgroup suffering may produce feelings 
of group-based guilt (Branscombe et al., 2002; 
Mallett & Swim, 2007). If group-based guilt 
occurs, it could be suffi cient to motivate major-
ity group members to alleviate guilt by engaging 
in reparative action on behalf of minority group 
members (Doosje et al., 1998; Swim & Miller, 
1999). Therefore, we expect that feelings of 
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group-based guilt will mediate the association 
between outgroup perspective taking and par-
ticipation in collective action. We may fi nd only 
partial, rather than full, mediation because guilt 
tends to be experienced at a moderate level 
(Swim & Miller, 1999) and because guilt may 
not be the only emotion associated with outgroup 
perspective taking. Later we discuss the possibility 
that group-based anger might also occur.
The possible role of ingroup 
identifi cation
In addition to testing our proposed model we 
explore the role of ingroup identifi cation in the 
aforementioned process. In a series of studies 
Zebel et al. (2008) asked Dutch participants to 
imagine themselves as slaves or not and then 
evaluate scenarios about the Dutch slave trade. 
Imagining themselves as slaves was positively 
associated with reports of group-based guilt, 
but only among participants with low levels of 
Dutch identifi cation. Moreover, guilt was related 
to support for a government apology, though 
unrelated to fi nancial compensation. Although 
Zebel et al.’s work did not study collective action 
and found mixed support for attempts to repair 
intergroup relations, it does provide initial 
support for the role of perspective taking in ma-
jority group members’ feelings of group-based 
guilt. Their research also suggests the possibil-
ity that high and low identifi ed members of a 
group might show differences in the experience 
of group-based guilt if encouraged to take the 
perspective of an outgroup.
Based on these preliminary fi ndings, it is pos-
sible that taking the outgroup perspective might 
initiate guilt, and subsequently collective action, 
more for some people than others. Specifi cally, as 
also proposed by Zebel et al. (2008), the effects 
of outgroup perspective taking on group-based 
guilt and collective action may depend upon 
the extent to which majority group members 
are identifi ed with their ingroup. Engaging in 
outgroup perspective taking may entail nega-
tive thinking about the ingroup. People who 
are highly identifi ed with the ingroup resist 
threats to the positive image of the ingroup, and 
tend to report feeling little group-based guilt 
(Doosje, et al., 1998). Consequently, the degree 
to which one is identifi ed with the ingroup may 
moderate the infl uence of perspective taking 
on feelings of group-based guilt (Zebel et al., 
2008) and participation in collective action.
Our research goes beyond that of Zebel et al. 
in four ways. First, we examine responses to 
contemporary intergroup confl ict as opposed 
to past wrongdoing. Considering examples of 
current confl ict might inspire greater feelings 
of group-based guilt compared with thinking 
about past transgressions (Branscombe et al., 
2002) and greater feelings of guilt might in-
spire effortful behavior such as participation 
in collective action. Second, we evaluate out-
group perspective taking by examining the way 
people naturally interpret events (Studies 1 
and 2) and by instructing participants to take 
the outgroup’s perspective (Study 3). We might 
fi nd that the same model holds for spontaneous 
and deliberate perspective taking. Alternatively, 
deliberate perspective taking might prompt 
a more defensive mindset than spontaneous 
perspective taking and thus make ingroup 
identifi cation more relevant to the process. 
Third, we examine actual behavior in response 
to discrimination rather than support for a 
government apology that may not personally 
affect outgroup members. Fourth, although 
Zebel et al.’s data are consistent with a mediation 
model, they do not test mediation. We test a full 
model of associations between outgroup per-
spective taking, group-based guilt, and par-
ticipation in collective action, thereby increasing 
understanding of majority group members’ 
motivation to act on behalf of an outgroup.
The possible role of group-based anger
We also explore the possibility that group-
based anger infl uences collective action on 
behalf of an outgroup. It is diffi cult to make clear 
predictions regarding the role of group-based 
anger because there is considerably less research 
on group-based anger than group-based guilt. 
However, we know that at the individual level, 
anger results from determining that an external 
agent is responsible for a transgression against 
oneself or another party (Lazarus, 1991). At the 
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group level, feelings of anger elicit a desire to 
confront, oppose or argue against the agent (an 
individual or group) who is responsible for a 
blameworthy action (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & 
Smith, 2002; Frijda, 1986; Iyer, Schmader, & 
Lickel, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000). Research 
shows that Germans experienced anger when 
they perceived that their government had mis-
treated a disadvantaged outgroup (Montada & 
Schneider, 1989) and that group-based anger 
predicted collective action on behalf of the 
ingroup (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 
2004). Indeed, Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002) 
hypothesize that group-based anger might be 
a more powerful predictor of collective action 
than group-based guilt.
Yet there is reason to question the ability of 
group-based anger to motivate action on behalf 
of an outgroup, especially in comparison with 
group-based guilt. The extent to which group-
based anger and group-based guilt motivate 
action likely differs because of the typical target 
of each emotion. Anger tends to direct action 
against the perpetrating agent rather than 
on behalf of the harmed group. Therefore, if 
collective action is construed as a way to repair 
damaged intergroup relationships rather than 
as a way to punish the blameworthy party, anger 
might not motivate collective action as strongly 
as guilt, or at all. Further, group-based guilt is a 
refl ective emotion and group-based anger is a 
reactive emotion (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 
1995; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988). Refl ective emotions 
might be more likely to motivate action on 
behalf of another group, whereas reactive emo-
tions might be more likely to motivate action 
against a particular group. Given the divergent 
perspectives on the power of group-based anger 
and guilt to predict collective action on behalf of 
an outgroup, we simultaneously examine group-
based guilt and anger to determine their relative 
power to predict collective action.
We also test whether outgroup perspective 
taking indirectly leads to participation in collec-
tive action via feelings of group-based anger. 
Finlay and Stephan (2000) found that when 
Whites took the perspective of an African American 
who expressed anger about discrimination, 
they reported feeling angry. At the group level, 
majority group members who take an outgroup’s 
perspective may consider the role that an exter-
nal agent, such as the government or university 
administration, plays in harming the minority 
group. Perceiving outgroup suffering along 
with attributing responsibility to a university 
administration may produce feelings of anger 
(Leach et al., 2002). If outgroup perspective 
taking and group-based anger are each directly 
related to participation in collective action, 
then feelings of group-based anger might also 
mediate the relationship between perspective 
taking and action.
Overview of studies
Three studies tested a preliminary model of 
the role of outgroup perspective taking and 
group-based guilt in majority group members’ 
participation in collective action on behalf 
of an outgroup. In Study 1, we examined 
the prediction that spontaneously taking the 
outgroup perspective was directly related to 
participation in collective action on behalf of 
that group. Study 2 replicated the direct effect 
of perspective taking on action, tested the direct 
effect of group-based guilt on collective action, 
and tested whether feelings of group-based guilt 
mediated the relationship between perspective 
taking and action. Finally, in order to resolve 
ambiguity regarding the direction of the effects 
demonstrated, in Study 3 we manipulated 
perspective taking, thereby demonstrating its 
causal role in the subsequent processes. In add-
ition, in each study we explored whether ingroup 
identifi cation moderated the positive effects of 
outgroup perspective taking on willingness to 
participate in collective action. We also tested 
the direct and indirect role of group-based anger 
in collective action on behalf of an outgroup 
(Studies 1, 2).
In all three studies, participants considered 
actual instances of hate crimes that targeted non-
heterosexuals (Study 1) and Blacks (Studies 2 
and 3) in their university community—a 
surprisingly pervasive problem given advances 
in civil rights that have occurred over the years 
(Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). Unlike past 
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research that typically examines policy support 
or, at most, self-reported willingness to engage 
in collective action, in the fi rst two studies we 
analyze self-reports of actual participation in 
collective action.
Study 1
The main purpose of this study was to test 
a central prediction of our model; that out-
group perspective taking would be related to 
participation in collective action on behalf of 
that group. We examined this question within 
the context of an incident of intergroup confl ict 
that occurred on a college campus. Lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual (LGB) student leaders 
received emails and phone calls that threat-
ened their lives. In response, some students 
engaged in collective action to protest the 
attacks and demand social change from the 
administration. The administration responded 
to the collective student effort by pledging to 
enact university policies to improve intergroup 
relations on campus for LGB students. Thus, 
this incident provided an opportunity to study 
actual participation in collective action rather 
than support for apology or other indirect meas-
ures of attempts at social change.
The secondary purpose of the study was to 
explore the role of ingroup identifi cation and 
group-based anger in this process. Because past 
research has found that ingroup identifi cation 
moderates the infl uence of deliberate perspec-
tive taking (Zebel et al., 2008), in the present 
study we also examined how it was related to 
spontaneous perspective taking. Further, we 
examined whether feelings of group-based 
anger were directly related to collective action.
Method
Participants We gave 275 heterosexual 
participants (146 female, 118 male, 11 did not 
report gender) course credit for the present 
study. Participants indicated their sexual 
orientation in response to an item that read, 
‘On the following scale, chose the step that 
best describes your own sexual orientation,’: 
1, exclusively heterosexual; 2, predominantly 
heterosexual, incidentally homosexual; 3, equally 
heterosexual and homosexual; 4 predominantly 
homosexual, but more than incidentally heterosexual; 
5, predominantly homosexual, incidentally heterosexual; 
and 6, exclusively homosexual. Participants who 
chose the number 1 were included in the ana-
lysis (137 female, 109 male, 6 did not report 
gender).
Materials and procedure All measures were 
completed on the Internet.1 Participants fi rst 
completed an 18-item measure of heterosexual 
identification (Swim & Mallett, 2005, see 
Appendix for a list of items) so we could test 
whether ingroup identifi cation moderated the 
infl uence of perspective taking on collective 
action. Items were answered using a scale from 1, 
not at all to 7, very much (M = 4.27, SD = .76). We 
averaged participants’ responses to these items 
to form a measure of ingroup identifi cation 
(α = .80).
Participants then read a summary of events 
surrounding a hate crime against LGB students, 
along with the following instructions based on 
McPherson and Janoff-Bulman’s (2000) study 
of perspective taking:
Now that you have been thinking about the events 
that led to the current LGB climate on campus, 
we would like to know more about your personal 
reactions to this situation. Please describe in your 
own words your thoughts and feelings about the 
(1) incidents that occurred, (2) the way in which 
the students responded, and fi nally (3) how the 
administration reacted.
Unlike other research that measures dispos-
itional perspective taking (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & 
Luce, 1997) or intentionally manipulates per-
spective taking by asking participants to put 
themselves in the shoes of a character in a 
scenario (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), we 
assessed the number of times that participants 
spontaneously took the perspective of LGB 
students in their written response to the hate 
crime and its surrounding events. We fi rst divided 
each written response into coding units that 
refl ected thought or phrase breaks (M = 6.32, 
SD = 2.93 for the number of written statements; 
see McPherson & Janoff-Bulman, 2000 for more 
detail). Then, two trained research assistants 
determined whether or not each unit of the 
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participant’s writing took the perspective of the 
LGB students and expressed understanding of 
the consequences of the hate crime for targets 
of discrimination. An example of taking the 
LGB students’ perspective is, “I understand how 
the death threats interrupted LGB students’ 
life on campus, it must have been really upset-
ting.” We averaged the coders ratings’ of the 
total number of times the participant took the 
perspective of LGB students in their written 
responses to obtain a measure of outgroup 
perspective taking (M = .92, SD = .93; intraclass 
correlation coeffi cient = .89).
We were also interested in whether feelings of 
group-based anger might be directly related to 
collective action, so we coded the spontaneous 
written responses for the amount of anger ex-
pressed at the university administration. Ratings 
of anger expression ranged from 0, not at all to 4, 
very much (M = .48, SD = .68; intraclass correlation 
coeffi cient = .93). We believe that this provides 
a somewhat indirect measure of expressions of 
anger at a blameworthy agent, in this case, the 
university administration.
Heterosexual participants then answered yes 
or no to fi ve questions that represented vari-
ous types of collective action that they might 
have taken on behalf of LGB students in re-
sponse to the hate crime (“I attended meetings 
of LGB groups;” “I attended ALLIES Straight 
But Not Narrow Program;” “I attended a lecture 
or presentation by an LGB person or gay rights 
activist;” “I attended the rally on September 14, 
2002;” “I attended the conference on Septem-
ber 13–15, 2002”). These activities were aimed at 
formulating a plan for the university to respond 
to hate crimes and therefore serve as a measure 
of collective action on behalf of an outgroup. 
We summed the ‘yes’ answers to each of the fi ve 
behaviors for each participant and divided the 
sum by fi ve to create an average score for par-
ticipation in collective action.2 Observed scores 
on the collective action item ranged from 0 to 4 
(M = .15, SD = .09).
Results and discussion
We calculated the correlation between all 
variables included in the Study 1 analyses. 
Correlations ranged from non-signifi cant to 
moderate, and were in the expected direction 
(see Table 1, above the diagonal).
We conducted two transformations on the 
data before estimating the remaining analyses. 
First, we centered the variables. Second, the dis-
tribution of participation in collective action 
was slightly positively skewed. We used a square 
root transformation to correct the positive skew 
prior to the reported analyses. Results for the 
untransformed variable are nearly identical to 
those for the transformed variable; this is true 
for Studies 1 and 2.
Perspective taking We expected outgroup per-
spective taking to be related to heterosexuals’ 
participation in collective action on behalf of 
non-heterosexuals. To examine this prediction, 
we regressed collective action on outgroup 
perspective taking. Because some research has 
found gender differences in helping behavior 
(Batson, 1998), we included gender as a covariate 
in all analyses.3 As predicted, perspective taking 
and collective action were positively related, 
Table 1. Correlations between the variables used in Studies 1 and 2.  Correlations above the diagonal 
represent Study 1 and correlations below the diagonal represent Study 2
Ingroup 
identifi cation
Outgroup 
perspective 
taking
Group-based 
anger
Group-based 
guilt
Collective 
action
Ingroup identifi cation — –.13* –.01 —  .10
Outgroup perspective taking –.09 —  .14* —  .24***
Group-based anger  .02  .05 — —  .18**
Group-based guilt –.19***  .34***  .08 — —
Collective action –.05  .20***  .15*  .18** —
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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β = .26, t(217) = 3.89, p < .001. As heterosexuals’ 
spontaneous reports of outgroup perspective 
taking increased, reports of participation in activ-
ities to improve the status of non-heterosexuals 
increased. To our knowledge, this is the fi rst 
empirical demonstration that outgroup per-
spective taking is related to collective action 
on behalf of an outgroup. In fact, we found no 
studies that assessed the association between 
perspective taking and any type of collective 
action.
We then examined whether ingroup iden-
tifi cation moderated the relationship between 
perspective taking and participation in collec-
tive action. In the fi rst step of the analysis, we 
regressed collective action on participant gender, 
ingroup identifi cation, and perspective taking. 
This step was signifi cant, R 2 = .10, F(2, 220) = 7.59, 
p < .001. Specifi cally, we found an association 
between identification and participation in 
collective action, β = .24, t(220) = 3.59, p < .001. 
As identifi cation with heterosexuals increased, 
so did action on behalf of non-heterosexuals. 
The fi nding is somewhat surprising because 
ingroup identifi cation, particularly for high 
status group members, might be expected to lead 
to minimizing rather than acknowledging the 
struggles faced by outgroup members. A positive 
association between identifi cation and collec-
tive action could be unique to group member-
ships such as sexual orientation because the 
majority of heterosexuals rarely consider what 
it means to be heterosexual. Those who have 
thought about their sexual orientation might 
represent a different type of heterosexual, one 
who thinks about the impact of sexual orientation 
on life more generally, and one who is therefore 
more likely to help the outgroup.
In the second step, we added the product 
of identifi cation and perspective taking to the 
model. This step was not signifi cant, R 2 = .09, 
F(2, 220) = 6.47, p = ns; identifi cation did not 
moderate the effect of spontaneous perspective 
taking on collective action, β = .11, t(220) = 1.70, 
p = ns. In other words, identifi cation with the 
ingroup did not increase or decrease the asso-
ciation between spontaneous outgroup per-
spective taking and participation in collective 
action.4 Of course, this lack of association 
may also be a function of the unique meaning 
associated with individuals who identify with 
heterosexuals. It is also possible that spontan-
eous perspective taking differs from deliberate 
perspective taking in the extent to which it 
prompts defense of the ingroup.
Group-based anger We also examined whether 
the amount of anger expressed at the admin-
istration was directly related to collective action. 
We regressed participation in collective action 
on gender and the amount of anger expressed 
at the university administration. We found an 
association between anger at the administra-
tion and collective action, β = .18, t(220) = 2.70, 
p = .007. As heterosexuals’ expressions of anger 
at the university administration increased, so did 
reports of participating in activities to improve 
the status of non-heterosexuals.
We next investigated whether group-based 
anger mediated the relationship between out-
group perspective taking and collective action. 
We followed Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recom-
mendations for testing mediation, which 
involves four steps. Again, we included gender 
as a covariate in the analyses. First, the pre-
dictor (perspective taking) was related to the 
mediator (anger at the administration), β = .15, 
t(220) = 2.23, p = .03. Second, as reported earlier, 
the predictor (perspective taking) was related 
to the dependent variable (collective action). 
Controlling for the predictor, the mediator was 
related to collective action, β = .14, t(220) = 2.18, 
p = .03. Controlling for the mediator, the pre-
dictor was related to collective action, β = .24, 
t(220) = 3.59, p < .001. However, the indirect 
effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective taking on 
collective action was not signifi cant (z = .32, 
p = ns). Therefore, anger at the university 
administration did not partially mediate the 
relationship between spontaneous outgroup 
perspective taking and collective action.
In sum, the results of Study 1 suggest that, con-
sistent with our proposed model, outgroup per-
spective taking is related to prosocial behavior 
at the group level; stepping into the shoes of an 
outgroup is directly related to collective action 
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to aid that group. Additional analyses showed 
that anger at the administration for their 
response to the hate crime was also related to 
collective action on behalf of non-heterosexuals. 
However, group-based anger did not mediate 
the association between outgroup perspective 
taking and collective action. Finally, ingroup 
identifi cation did not moderate the relationship 
between spontaneous perspective taking and 
collective action.
Study 2
In Study 1, we established that spontaneous out-
group perspective taking is related to majority 
group members’ collective action on behalf of 
minority group members. In Study 2, we tested 
the principal route through which we expected 
perspective taking to infl uence participation in 
collective action. Specifi cally, we assessed the 
associations between outgroup perspective 
taking, group-based guilt, and collective action 
on behalf of an outgroup. As in Study 1, we 
explored these questions within the context of 
an actual incident of intergroup confl ict that 
occurred on a college campus. In this instance, 
African American student leaders were the targets 
of intimidation and death threats. Students 
responded by engaging in collective action to 
demand resolution from the administration. The 
administration countered by drafting a proposal 
to enact university policies that would improve 
intergroup relations on campus, especially for 
minority group members. We expected to fi nd 
(i) a positive association between outgroup 
perspective taking and White’s participation 
in collective action on behalf of Blacks, (ii) a 
positive association between White guilt and 
collective action, and (iii) that group-based 
guilt at least partially mediated the relationship 
between outgroup perspective taking and col-
lective action.
As in Study 1, we also explored the roles of 
ingroup identifi cation and group-based anger 
in this process. Based on the results of Study 1, 
we do not expect ingroup identification to 
moderate the relationship between spontan-
eous perspective taking and collective action. 
Also based on Study 1, we suspect that group-
based anger will be directly related to collective 
action but not mediate the association between 
perspective taking and action, with or without 
the inclusion of group-based guilt.
Method
Participants For the hate crime targeting 
Blacks, students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course (183 females, 142 males) 
completed all measures in large group testing 
sessions. Students of several ethnic/racial 
backgrounds participated in the study, but 
only members of the majority group, Whites 
(139 females, 110 males), are included in the 
analysis.
Materials and procedure Participants first 
reported the extent to which they identifi ed with 
Whites using 18 items (Swim & Mallett, 2005; 
see Appendix). Items were answered using a 
scale from 1, not at all to 7, very much (M = 4.34, 
SD = .76). We averaged participants’ responses 
to these items to form a measure of ingroup 
identifi cation (α = .85).
Next, Whites were presented with a summary 
of events surrounding a hate crime against 
Blacks, read the same instructions based on 
McPherson and Janoff-Bulman’s (2000) study of 
perspective taking, and wrote the same type of 
response in terms of their reactions to the events. 
Trained coders used the same coding scheme 
to assess the number of times that Whites took 
the perspective of Black students. We averaged the 
coders’ ratings of the frequency of perspective 
taking; inter-rater reliability for the coding was 
good (intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .92, 
M = 2.72, SD = 1.58).
As in Study 1, we used the same procedure to 
code the written responses for the amount of 
anger expressed at the university administration. 
Ratings of anger expressed in the essay ranged 
from 0, not at all to 4, very much (M = .60, 
SD = .85; intraclass correlation coeffi cient = .93). 
Participants then completed the fi ve-item White 
guilt scale (Swim & Miller, 1999), composed 
of items like ‘I feel guilty about the past and 
present social inequality of Black Americans 
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(i.e. slavery, poverty).’ Items were answered on 
a scale from 1, not at all guilty to 7, very guilty 
(α = .87, M = 3.42, SD = 1.48).
Finally, White participants indicated whether 
they participated in eight types of collective 
action to benefit Blacks. Items included, 
‘I attempted to/succeeded at rushing the fi eld 
at the Blue and White game;’ ‘I attended the 
rally held by students, at 9:00 pm at the HUB 
on April 21st;’ ‘I attended the NO HATE AT 
PENN STATE rally at Old Main on April 24th 
at 4:00 pm;’ ‘I spent the night at the HUB as 
part of the Village;’ ‘I visited the Village, at 
the HUB;’ ‘I wrote letters to the editors of the 
Daily Collegian, Centre Daily Times, or any other 
newspaper or news organization (regardless 
of whether they were published);’ ‘I attended 
the rally on September 14, 2001;’ ‘I attended 
the conference on September 14–16, 2001.’ 
Participants answered yes or no for all items. 
Again, all actions were aimed at improving the 
state of intergroup relations for Black students. 
Therefore for Whites, this serves as a measure 
of collective action on behalf of an outgroup. 
We summed the ‘yes’ responses for each partici-
pant and divided the sum by eight to produce 
an average score for participation in collective 
action. Observed scores for collective action 
ranged from 0 to 8 (M = .17, SD = .15).
Results
We calculated the correlations between all 
variables used in Study 2. As in Study 1, correl-
ations ranged from non-signifi cant to moder-
ate, and were in the direction expected by past 
research (see Table 1, below the diagonal).
As in Study 1, we conducted two transform-
ations on the data before estimating the remain-
ing analyses. First, we centered the variables. 
Second, we again found that the measure of 
collective action was slightly positively skewed 
so we performed a square root transformation 
before conducting the analyses.
Perspective taking To determine whether 
outgroup perspective taking was directly 
related to participation in collective action, we 
regressed participation in collective action on 
outgroup perspective taking, controlling for 
gender. We found the predicted relationship 
between perspective taking and collective action, 
β = .17, t(228) = 2.54, p = .01. As in Study 1, as 
spontaneous outgroup perspective taking 
increased, so did reports of participation in 
collective action.
To determine whether ingroup identifi cation 
moderated this relation, in step 1 we regressed 
collective action on participant gender, ingroup 
identifi cation, and perspective taking. Unlike 
Study 1, this step was not signifi cant, R 2 = .07, 
F(2, 228) = 5.71, p = ns. Ingroup identifi cation 
was not directly related to collective action, 
β = –.06, p = ns. This result lends further sup-
port to the speculation that there might be 
something unique about identifi cation with a 
sexual orientation group as opposed to a racial 
or gender group.
We added the product of identification 
and perspective taking in step 2. As in Study 1, 
this step was not significant, R 2 = .07, F(2, 
228) = 5.71, p = ns. Ingroup identification 
did not moderate the relationship between 
spontaneous perspective taking and collective 
action, β = –.04, p = ns.5
Group-based guilt We continued testing 
the proposed model by determining whether 
feelings of group-based guilt were directly 
related to participation in collective action by 
regressing participation in collective action 
on White guilt, controlling for gender. As 
expected, White guilt and collective action were 
positively related, β = .18, p < .01. As reports of 
White guilt increased, so did participation in 
collective action.
Mediation In addition to predicting that per-
spective taking and group-based guilt would 
directly relate to collective action on behalf of 
an outgroup, our model suggests that group-
based guilt would at least partially mediate the 
relationship between perspective taking and 
action. To examine this prediction, we followed 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations 
for testing mediation. Table 2 shows the results 
of this analysis. As expected, feelings of White 
guilt partially mediated the relationship between 
spontaneous outgroup perspective taking and 
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participation in collective action. The indirect 
effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective taking on 
collective action was significant (z = –2.05, 
p < .05). Thus, when majority group members 
took the perspective of the minority group, they 
felt group-based guilt and were motivated to 
take action on behalf of the outgroup.
Group-based anger In light of an emerging 
interest in group-based anger, we also explored 
whether anger was directly or indirectly related 
to participation in collective action on behalf 
of an outgroup by regressing participation in 
collective action on participant gender and 
expressions of anger directed at the university 
administration. As in Study 1, anger at the uni-
versity administration was directly related to 
collective action, β = .13, p < .05.
Given that anger at the administration was 
related to collective action, we also examined 
whether anger mediated the association between 
perspective taking and action. As in Study 1, we 
included gender as a covariate in these analyses. 
Perspective taking was not related to feelings of 
anger at the administration, β = .06, p = ns. Since 
the fi rst step of mediation was not met, we did 
not continue to test for mediation.
Finally, we examined whether feelings of 
group-based guilt continued to mediate when 
feelings of anger at the administration were in 
the equation. We regressed collective action on 
participant gender, outgroup perspective taking, 
group-based guilt, and group-based anger at the 
administration. The path from perspective taking 
to action remained signifi cant, β = .14, p < .05. 
The path from group-based guilt to collective 
action, controlling for anger and perspective 
taking, remained signifi cant, β = .13, p = .05. 
The path from group-based anger to collective 
action, controlling for guilt and perspective 
taking also remained signifi cant, β = .14, p < .05. 
The indirect effect (Sobel, 1982) of perspective 
taking on collective action through group-based 
guilt was signifi cant (z = 1.97, p < .05). Therefore 
feelings of group-based guilt continued to 
partially mediate between perspective taking 
and action, even when group-based anger was 
simultaneously entered as a predictor of col-
lective action.
Discussion
Garnering additional support for our model, 
we found that perspective taking and group-
based guilt worked separately and in concert to 
infl uence collective action on behalf of an out-
group. That is, as perspective taking and feelings 
of White guilt increased so did participation in 
collective action. Moreover, White guilt mediated 
the relationship between outgroup perspec-
tive taking and action, further supporting our 
Table 2. White guilt mediates the association between perspective taking and participation in collective action 
in Study 2
Perspective taking → White guilt → 
Collective action
Unstandardized 
beta 
Standard 
error
Standardized 
beta
t p
Step 1: Perspective taking → White Guilt 
R2: .15, F = 22.95
.28 .06 .30 5.08 .0001
Step 2: Perspective taking → 
Collective action
R 2: .07, F = 8.15 [R 2: .05, F = 5.72]
.07 .06 .17 2.41 .02
Step 3: White guilt, controlling for 
Perspective taking → Collective action
R 2: .05, F = 5.92 [R 2: .05, F = 5.92]
.11 .05 .13 1.95 .05
Step 4: Perspective taking, controlling for 
White guilt → Collective action
R 2: .05, F = 5.91 [R 2: .05, F = 5.91]
.06 .03 .15 2.24 .03
Sobel = 1.99, p = .047
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proposed model. Also, as in Study 1, although 
group-based anger was related to collective 
action, it did not mediate the association between 
perspective taking and action and did not affect 
the ability of guilt to explain participation in 
collective action.
Although our theoretically preferred model 
depicts White guilt as the mediator between per-
spective taking and participation in collective 
action, other causal orders are possible. For 
example, perspective taking may mediate the 
relationship between White guilt and collective 
action, or collective action may cause perspec-
tive taking, which could then produce feelings 
of group-based guilt. Tests of these two models 
indicated that they were viable alternatives to 
our theoretically preferred model.
Thus, the strength of our fi rst two studies is that 
they compellingly demonstrate the associations 
between outgroup perspective taking, feelings 
of group-based guilt and participation in col-
lective action in a real world setting. Yet the cor-
relational nature of the studies leaves us unable 
to specify whether our model accurately accounts 
for collective action on behalf of outgroups. 
Because we believe that perspective taking 
causes feelings of group-based guilt and existing 
theory supports group-based guilt as a medi-
ator between perspective taking and collec-
tive action, in Study 3 we manipulate perspective 
taking in order to test the causal nature of the 
associations. Since feelings of guilt consistently 
played a more signifi cant role than feelings of 
anger in our studies, we refrain from examining 
group-based anger in Study 3.
Study 3
In Study 3, we extend the present research in 
three ways. First, and most importantly, we mani-
pulate perspective taking to demonstrate its 
causal role in producing feelings of group-
based guilt and willingness to engage in collec-
tive action. We expect that asking Whites to 
take Blacks’ perspective will cause feelings of 
White guilt and increase willingness to act on 
behalf of Blacks.
Second, as also proposed by Zebel et al. 
(2008), we again examine whether ingroup 
identifi cation interacts with perspective taking 
to predict willingness to engage in collective 
action. Although we did not fi nd that perspective 
taking and ingroup identifi cation interacted to 
predict group-based guilt or collective action 
in Studies 1 and 2, we suspect this might be 
due to the fact that we measured the degree to 
which participants spontaneously took the 
outgroup’s perspective rather than deliberately 
manipulating perspective taking. If encourag-
ing people to take the outgroup perspective 
provides the necessary psychological kick to 
initiate actions to protect the positive image and 
status of the ingroup, then we might fi nd that 
ingroup identifi cation moderates the effect of 
deliberate perspective taking on group-based guilt 
and willingness to engage in collective action. 
If this is the case, then consistent with Zebel 
et al. (2008) we expect that when led to take the 
outgroup perspective, White’s willingness to 
engage in collective action should increase 
to the extent that being White is unimport-
ant to them (i.e. they lack identifi cation with 
Whites). When not led to take the outgroup 
perspective, this relation should be absent.
Third, replicating Study 2, we test whether 
group-based guilt mediates the association 
between perspective taking and collective action. 
Validation of each prediction provides greater 
confi dence regarding the veracity of our model 
of majority group member’s collective action 
on behalf of a minority outgroup. Because 
feelings of group-based anger did not mediate 
the relationship between perspective taking 
and action in Studies 1 or 2, we no longer con-
sider anger.
Method
Participants Forty-seven White students 
participated in the study in exchange for course 
credit.
Materials and procedure Participants were 
presented with a summary of hate crimes and 
acts of aggression that recently targeted Black 
students. Following Vescio et al. (2003), half of 
the participants read instructions to take the 
perspective of the targeted group while they 
read the summary:
463
Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action
When reading about the incidents, pay careful 
attention to the content of the material, but try 
to step into the shoes of the African American 
student(s). Try to feel the full impact that the 
incident had on the student and imagine how 
he/she feels as a result.
The other half of the participants read instruc-
tions to remain objective as they read the 
summary:
When reading about the incidents, pay careful 
attention to the content of the material, but take 
an objective perspective. Try not to get caught up in 
how the people involved feel about the experience 
described or how it affected his/her life.
Then, all participants completed the fi ve-item 
White guilt scale (α = .88, M = 3.39, SD = 1.34; 
Swim & Miller, 1999) and reported the likelihood 
that they would engage in four types of collective 
action on behalf of African Americans on campus 
(Volunteer to put up fl iers on grounds inform-
ing students of what has happened on grounds; 
Volunteer to hand out black ribbons at the next 
home football game; Obtain signatures for a 
University Judiciary Committee referendum to 
create specifi c and severe punishment guidelines 
for judicial offenses motivated by hatred based 
on race or ethnicity; Help to organize an event 
to show support of targets of discrimination). 
Each item was evaluated on a scale from 1, strongly 
disagree to 7, strongly agree. We averaged the items 
to form a composite measure of intention to 
engage in collective action (α = .78, M = 4.01, 
SD = .128).
Finally, participants reported the extent to 
which they identifi ed with Whites using 18 items 
(Swim & Mallett, 2005; see Appendix for items). 
We averaged participants’ responses to form a 
composite measure of ingroup identifi cation 
(α = .86, M = 4.19, SD = .74).6
Results and discussion
Perspective taking As in Studies 1 and 2, we 
standardized all variables before conducting the 
analyses. We began by testing the association 
between outgroup perspective taking and 
willingness to engage in collective action. If 
deliberately encouraging participants to take 
an outgroup’s perspective prompts identity 
maintenance processes, then we should fi nd that 
ingroup identifi cation moderates the effect of 
outgroup perspective taking such that perspective 
taking causes willingness to engage in action to 
increase as the importance of being White and 
therefore defending the ingroup decreases. In 
the control condition (no perspective taking), we 
did not expect White identifi cation to infl uence 
willingness to act.
We tested whether perspective taking and 
identifi cation with Whites interacted to predict 
willingness to engage in collective action on 
behalf of Blacks by regressing collective action on 
participant gender, ingroup identifi cation, and 
perspective taking in step 1, and the product of 
identifi cation and perspective taking in step 2. 
Perspective taking was coded 1 = perspective 
taking and –1 = no perspective taking/control. 
Consistent with predictions, the change be-
tween step 1 and step 2 was signifi cant, R2 = .14, 
F(4, 46) = 2.39, p < .05. Perspective taking and 
ingroup identifi cation interacted to predict 
willingness to engage in collective action, 
β = –.46 (.20), p = .03. When Whites were 
asked to deliberately take Blacks’ perspective, 
as White identifi cation and perhaps concern 
for protecting the image of their ingroup 
decreased, willingness to engage in collective 
action increased, β = –.80 (.34), p = .025. In 
contrast, in the control condition (no perspective 
taking), White identifi cation did not infl uence 
willingness to engage in collective action, β = .12 
(.24), p = ns. Therefore, deliberately taking the 
outgroup perspective was necessary for Whites 
to be willing to act on behalf of Blacks, but it 
was more effective when Whites placed less value 
on their group membership.7
Group-based guilt We continued testing the 
proposed model by determining whether feelings 
of group-based guilt were directly related to 
willingness to participate in collective action 
by regressing willingness to act on White guilt, 
controlling for gender. As expected, White guilt 
and collective action were positively related, 
β = .36 (.13), p = .01. As reports of White guilt 
increased, so did willingness to participate in 
collective action.
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Mediation analyses Given that ingroup iden-
tifi cation moderated the effects of perspective 
taking on White guilt and collective action, a 
conceptual replication of Study 2 entails con-
ducting a mediated moderation analyses (Muller, 
Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) to determine whether 
the experience of group-based guilt mediated 
the association between the perspective taking 
by White identifi cation interaction and wil-
lingness to engage in collective action, control-
ling for gender. According to Muller et al. 
(2005), mediated moderation can occur when: 
(i) the perspective taking by group identifi cation 
interaction predicts group-based guilt (the 
mediator) and group-based guilt predicts the 
dependent variable (willingness to engage in 
collective action), or (ii) group identifi cation 
predicts group-based guilt and the group-based 
guilt by perspective taking interaction predicts 
the dependent variable, or both. Note that both 
the main effect and the interaction within the 
fi rst or second part of the model described 
earlier must be met for mediated moderation 
to occur, and that only one of the two patterns 
described earlier are necessary to demonstrate 
mediated moderation.
As illustrated in Table 3, in step 1, the per-
spective taking by group identifi cation interaction 
signifi cantly predicted willingness to engage in 
collective action. In step 2, the interaction sig-
nifi cantly predicted the experience of group-
based guilt. Finally, as required to meet the 
conditions of mediated moderation, in step 3 
when group-based guilt and the guilt by per-
spective taking interaction were included, 
the perspective taking by group identifi cation 
interaction no longer predicted willingness 
to engage in collective action. However, the 
experience of group-based guilt did signifi cantly 
predict willingness to engage in collective 
action. A Sobel test confi rmed the indirect effect 
was signifi cant. Thus, mediated moderation 
was successfully demonstrated as condition 
‘i’ discussed earlier was met. Taking Blacks’ 
perspective caused feelings of White guilt that 
increased as White identifi cation decreased. 
Feelings of White guilt then increased willingness 
to take action on behalf of Blacks.8 When not led 
to take the outgroup perspective, the subsequent 
relations were absent.
Given that both the proposed mediator, 
group-based guilt, and the outcome variable, 
willingness to engage in collective action, were 
measured, it is useful to examine the reverse 
mediator–outcome pathway. Results of the re-
verse mediator–outcome analysis revealed that 
Table 3. White guilt mediates the association between the perspective taking by White identifi cation 
interaction and willingness to participate in collective action (Study 3).  Paths key to demonstrating mediated 
moderation are given in bold
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
(Criterion collective 
action)
(Criterion mediator) (Criterion collective 
action)
Group-based guilt
Predictor b (SE) p b (SE) p b (SE) p
Perspective-taking (PT) –.26 (.19) .19 –.39 (.18) .04 –.05 (.20) .81
Identifi cation (ID) –.34 (.21) .11 –.09 (.20) .65 –.14 (.23) .55
PT × ID –.46 (.21) .03 –.74 (.20) < .0005 –.138 (.23) .56
   Mediator
Guilt .54 (.22) .02
 Mediator × PT Sobel test: z = –2.05, p < .05
Guilt × PT .29 (.22) .18
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in step 2, although intent to engage in collective 
action was a signifi cant predictor of group-based 
guilt, β = .39 (.18), p = .03, the direct effect of the 
interaction remained signifi cant, β = –.57 (.20), 
p = .008. Moreover, a Sobel test confi rmed that 
the indirect effect was not signifi cant (z = –1.54, 
p = ns). This analysis provides strong support for 
our preferred theoretical model, demonstrat-
ing that feelings of group-based guilt partially 
mediate the relationship between the product 
of perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation 
and willingness to participate in collective action 
on behalf of an outgroup.
General discussion
Past research has rarely considered factors 
that motivate majority group members to take 
collective action on behalf of minority group 
members, but investigating such factors is im-
portant and useful because of majority group 
members’ unique ability to produce social 
change. We tested an initial model explaining 
majority group members’ participation in 
collective action and found that outgroup per-
spective taking and the experience of group-
based guilt were key antecedents of actions that 
helped an outgroup.
Results consistently supported our predictions. 
We established that among heterosexuals and 
Whites, outgroup perspective taking was posi-
tively related to participation in collective action 
on behalf of the outgroup (Studies 1 and 2). We 
also found support for the link between White 
guilt and both willingness to engage, and actual 
participation, in collective action (Studies 2 
and 3). Moreover, we demonstrated the effi cacy 
of the full model by showing that White guilt 
partially mediated the association between 
perspective taking and both willingness to par-
ticipate and actual participation in collective 
action on behalf of the outgroup (Studies 2 
and 3).
In addition to testing our main predictions, 
we also furthered understanding of the role of 
ingroup identifi cation in collective action on 
behalf of the outgroup. Exploratory analyses 
revealed that when we examined the effect of 
deliberately taking the outgroup perspective, 
outgroup perspective taking predicted feelings 
of group-based guilt and willingness to engage 
in collective action on behalf of the outgroup 
(Study 3). However, similar to the results of Zebel 
et al. (2004), the positive effect of deliberate per-
spective taking was most pronounced for those 
individuals who placed less value on being White. 
Specifi cally, when Whites took Blacks’ perspec-
tive, this caused feelings of White guilt that 
increased as White identifi cation, and perhaps 
concern for defending the ingroup, decreased 
(Study 3). White guilt then increased willingness 
to take action on behalf of Blacks; mediation 
did not occur when White participants did not 
take the perspective of Blacks. By contrast, when 
we examined spontaneous perspective taking 
(Studies 1 and 2), ingroup identifi cation did not 
alter the affect of outgroup perspective taking 
on group-based guilt or collective action. We 
suspect that this occurred because deliberately 
encouraging outgroup perspective taking trig-
gered identity maintenance processes among 
high but not low identifi ed group members. 
For example, Doosje et al. (1998) found that 
people with high ingroup identifi cation were 
resistant to threats to the positive image of the 
ingroup and reported less guilt than those who 
with low ingroup identifi cation. By comparison, 
spontaneous outgroup perspective taking might 
not have made participants’ group membership 
as salient and therefore may have failed to 
initiate the same type of identity maintenance 
processes.
Finally, although some research suggests that 
group-based anger may also infl uence partici-
pation in collective action, we found that group-
based anger played a limited role in initiating 
the form of collective action investigated in the 
current research. Although reports of group-
based anger at the university administration 
were directly related to participation in collec-
tive action (Studies 1 and 2), anger did not 
mediate the association between outgroup 
perspective taking and collective action. Perspec-
tive taking might not have related to the experi-
ence of group-based anger in Study 2 because 
it is unnecessary to see the world through the 
outgroup’s eyes in order to appraise an action 
committed by another as blameworthy. In 
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comparison, perspective taking is a necessary 
component of the experience of group-based 
guilt because seeing the world through the eyes 
of the outgroup contributes to one’s understand-
ing and appreciation of the harm done to the 
outgroup, which increases feelings of group-
based guilt that, in turn, lead to participation 
in collective action.
Importantly, feelings of group-based guilt 
continued to mediate the relationship between 
perspective taking and action even when feelings 
of group-based anger were included as a predic-
tor of collective action. This might have oc-
curred because feelings of guilt motivate people 
to repair damaged intergroup relations—the 
likely goal of collective action on behalf of an 
outgroup—whereas feelings of anger motiv-
ate people to confront or act against the 
perpetrator of a blameworthy action. It would 
be interesting in the future to examine whether 
the relative strength of group-based guilt and 
anger in predicting collective action vary as a 
function of how collective action is character-
ized. For example, group-based guilt might 
be more predictive of collective action that is 
characterized as a means of helping the minority 
outgroup, whereas group-based anger might 
be more predictive of collective action that is 
characterized as a means of rising up against 
the unjust aggressor.
It might also be worthwhile to consider the 
extent to which majority group members feel 
connected to the targeted minority group and 
therefore experience a dual identification. 
According to Gaertner and Dovidio’s Common 
Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), intergroup 
relations are often the most positive when majority 
and minority group members become aware of 
a shared superordinate group membership 
(e.g. we are all students at the same university). 
Recategorizing groups in this way improves 
intergroup attitudes and potentially facilitates 
positive intergroup contact by encouraging 
equal status, cooperation, and interpersonal 
interaction (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & 
Anastasio, 1996). Taking the outgroup per-
spective could create a similar mindset if major-
ity group members see the world through the 
eyes of a minority group member. Being less 
identifi ed with the majority ingroup might fur-
ther enable people to see the self as part of a 
shared superordinate group because they are 
not particularly motivated to protect the status 
of the ingroup.
In sum, we provided support for an initial 
model of collective action on behalf an outgroup 
as well as examined the relevance of ingroup 
identifi cation and group-based anger. Future 
research could build upon our model by 
examining the possibility that other group-based 
emotions might further explain participation 
in collective action. Recent research suggests 
that group-based feelings of shame (Lickel, 
Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004) might have 
interesting implications. For example, group-
based shame may manifest in distancing from 
ingroup members who caused the events or 
distancing from situations that remind people 
of the inequality (Lickel et al., 2004). If people 
distance from situations related to inequity, then 
shame might actually inhibit collective action. 
Future research could simultaneously assess 
other group-based emotions such as anger, 
shame and guilt to determine the unique power 
of each of these emotions to predict collective 
action taken on behalf of an outgroup, and to 
examine the extent to which each emotion serves 
to mediate the relationship between perspective 
taking and collective action.
Because of their larger numbers and greater 
relative power within society (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996), majority group 
members play a key role in enacting social 
change on a broad scale. Our research represents 
an important step in understanding why majority 
group members participate in collective action 
on behalf of minority groups. Taking the minority 
group perspective inspires collective action in 
majority group members because of feelings 
of group-based guilt. Moreover, the impact of 
deliberate outgroup perspective taking on guilt 
and action increases as ingroup identifi cation 
decreases, suggesting the possibility that different 
factors may increase guilt and action depending 
on ingroup identifi cation. By seeing through 
the eyes of minority group members, majority 
group members can be inspired to take action 
467
Mallett et al. outgroup perspective taking and collective action
in alliance with the minority group, which could 
perhaps reduce existing inequality more so than 
minority group members acting alone.
Notes
1. Participants completed several measures 
of attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of the 
incidents for a different study. We unsuccessfully 
attempted to measure feelings of heterosexual 
guilt. Item analysis showed that the only 
reverse-scored item was positively correlated 
with the other items, suggesting that participants 
might not have understood the construct 
(α = .61).
2. It is possible to conceptualize collective action as 
dichotomous rather than continuous 
(i.e. whether participants took action or 
not). A logistic regression showed that, again, 
perspective taking was positively associated 
with participation in collective action, 
β = .69, p < .001. Heterosexuals that took 
non-heterosexuals’ perspective were more likely 
to take collective action than those who did 
not. In both Studies 1 and 2, we also conducted 
logistic regression analyses for all analyses 
reported that used the participation in collective 
action dependent variable; the results were the 
same as those for the continuous variable.
3. In both Studies 1 and 2, we tested whether 
gender moderated the relationship between 
perspective taking, identifi cation, anger, 
or guilt and participation in collective action; 
it did not.
4. It is interesting to note that, using the same 
analytic procedure as we did for collective 
action, identifi cation did not moderate the 
degree to which perspective taking was related 
to anger, β = .22, t(219) = .61, p = ns.
5. Again, we tested whether identifi cation 
moderated the infl uence of perspective taking 
on group-based guilt and anger by using the 
same two-step analytic strategy that we used for 
collective action. We did not fi nd an interaction 
for guilt, β = –.47, t(236) = –1.36, p = ns, or anger 
at the administration, B = –.26, t(236) = –.74, 
p = ns.
6. An independent means t-test shows that 
identifi cation did not differ by perspective 
taking condition, t(45) = 1.52, p = ns. Whites who 
took Blacks’ perspective did not report different 
levels of White identifi cation than Whites who 
did not take Blacks’ perspective.
7. We expected the same pattern for group-based 
guilt and conducted the same regression 
analysis to examine our prediction. As expected, 
perspective taking and ingroup identifi cation 
interacted to predict group-based guilt, β = –.74 
(.20), p < .001. When Whites were asked to take 
Blacks’ perspective, group-based guilt increased 
as White identifi cation decreased, β = –.83 
(.30), p = .008. Therefore, given the lack of 
interaction between identity and perspective 
taking in Studies 1 and 2 and the presence of 
the interaction in Study 3, it appears that there 
is a critical distinction between spontaneous 
and deliberate outgroup perspective taking. 
Identifi cation maintenance processes are only 
triggered when people are asked to deliberately 
take the outgroup perspective.
8. Some readers might argue that we could have 
tested for mediated moderation by separately 
conducting mediation analyses within the 
perspective taking and control conditions (or 
conversely within the low and high ingroup 
identifi cation conditions). However, Muller 
et al. (2005) argue that is an inappropriate way 
of examining mediated moderation and that the 
full model we tested in Table 2 is appropriate. 
Nevertheless, to clarify the pattern of results, 
we tested mediation for the perspective taking 
condition and the control condition. We found 
that guilt mediated between identifi cation and 
action in the perspective taking condition, but 
not in the control condition. Therefore, it seems 
that perspective taking provides the necessary 
kick to produce guilt and collective action.
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Appendix
Identifi cation items
Whites [Heterosexuals] have much to be proud of 
these days.
I think that I am very different from most Whites 
[Heterosexuals].
I have spent time trying to fi nd out more about White 
[Heterosexual] culture, such as the history of 
Whites [Heterosexuals] in America.
I don’t have a lot in common with Whites 
[Heterosexuals].
I have diffi culty identifying with the culture of White 
Americans [Heterosexuals].
I really have not spent much time trying to learn more 
about the culture of Whites [Heterosexuals], such 
as their history and traditions.
I am very concerned about the problems Whites 
[Heterosexuals] have in today’s society.
When electing public officials, I would vote for 
candidates who I know consider issues that affect 
White Americans [Heterosexuals].
I feel an attachment to Whites [Heterosexuals]as a 
group.
I seek out information about the culture of Whites 
[Heterosexuals]
When I meet a White person [Heterosexual], I feel like 
I will have a lot in common with him or her.
I think a lot about how White people’s [Hetero-
sexuals] lives will be affected by their ethnic group 
membership.
I feel little sense of commitment to White people 
[Heterosexuals] even those who are close 
friends.
I think I have much in common with Whites 
[Heterosexuals].
I have learned a lot about the history and tradition 
of Whites [Heterosexuals].
I don’t actively seek out news and information on issues 
affecting Whites [Heterosexuals] in America.
I feel that it is important to keep up with issues 
that are important to Whites [Heterosexuals]in 
America.
I’m aware of the types of daily events Whites 
[Heterosexuals] tend to experience these days.
